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Abstract—Peer-to-peer (P2P) technology is popularly exploited
to enable large-scale content distribution (e.g., live and on-
demand video streaming) with low server costs. Most P2P
protocols in place are network agnostic, where peers download
content chunks from each other regardless of their ISP belonging,
leading to signiﬁcant amounts of inter-ISP trafﬁc. It has been a
daunting challenge how to design protocols that optimize the
P2P content distribution topology, such that inter-ISP trafﬁc is
minimized while the dissemination performance is maximized,
not to mention one that motivates peer’s voluntary ISP-aware
peer selection. In this paper, we formulate a social welfare
maximization framework for dynamical construction of the P2P
content distribution topology taking into consideration both
peers’ gain due to chunk downloading and inter-ISP trafﬁc that is
incurred. Given its nature of an assignment problem, we resort
to a primal-dual framework to design the solution algorithm,
which can be practically implemented as a set of distributed,
interleaving auctions, where peers bid for bandwidth to download
chunks at other peers considering the potential inter-ISP trafﬁc
as a cost factor. Such an auction-based mechanism encourages
peers to download from neighbors with low network costs in
between, in order to succeed in bandwidth acquisition for chunk
downloading. We analyze and prove the social optimality achieved
by the distributed auctions and verify the performance of our
proposal using realistic emulation experiments with real P2P
trafﬁc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Forecasts from Cisco’s Visual Networking Index [1] reveal
that P2P trafﬁc is expected to grow to more than 7 Petabytes
per month by 2014 – more than the double of the amount
of P2P trafﬁc in 2009. Most of the existing P2P protocols
(for ﬁle sharing, live and on-demand media streaming, etc.)
are network agnostic, i.e., peers pick peers to download from
as long as the latter cache the content in need, regardless
of the ISP belonging of each other. This has resulted in
signiﬁcant amounts of inter-ISP trafﬁc that cost many ISPs
dearly, leading to their P2P trafﬁc ﬁltering, which in turn
signiﬁcantly deteriorates the performance of P2P applications.
There have been many efforts on minimizing inter-ISP
trafﬁc by connecting peers to nearby neighbors in the same
AS or ISP. Aggarwal et al. [2] and Xie et al. [3] advocate
collaboration between P2P applications and ISPs, where ISPs
provide information of the underlying network (e.g., band-
width, distance) for a P2P application to make localized peer
selection. Picconi et al. [4] propose a two-tier adaptive overlay
structure, with highly clustered primary overlays built among
nearby peers and a number of secondary links interconnecting
the clusters. The secondary links are unchoked when necessary
to enable global stream propagation. Peer selection is carried
out at a coarse level in the above work, without guarantee
of the optimality of the resulting topologies in content dis-
tribution performance and inter-ISP trafﬁc reduction. Wang et
al. [5] formulate an optimization problem for ISP-friendly rate
allocation, aiming at guaranteed QoS for users, reduced server
load and reduced ISP-unfriendly trafﬁc. The rate allocation
optimization problem is modeled and solved in the ﬂuid level
(optimal ﬂow rate computation), and the results are translated
into a packet-scheduling algorithm for implementation.
This paper presents our initial attempt to design P2P pro-
tocols that encourage ISP-aware peer selection, in a fully
distributed algorithm framework. We ﬁrst formulate a social
welfare maximization framework for dynamical construction
of the P2P content distribution topology (namely deciding who
is downloading which content chunk from whom), where each
peer’s welfare is decided by its gain for receiving the chunks
and the network cost incurred due to receiving chunks from
different ISPs. Instead of ﬂow-level optimization, our opti-
mization framework models chunk-level content distribution
among the peers, to enable straightaway implementation of
the optimal chunk scheduling strategies in a real-world P2P
system, and to avoid loss of optimality due to the ﬂow rate-
to-packet scheduling translation.
The optimization is a more difﬁcult integer optimization
problem though. Nevertheless, given its nature of an assign-
ment problem, we resort to a primal-dual framework proposed
by Bertsekas et al. [6] to derive the solution. The solution algo-
rithm can be implemented as a set of distributed, interleaving
auctions in the P2P system: Each peer acts as an auctioneer
and hosts an auction to allocate its upload bandwidth for
serving chunks to requesting peers; each peer also bids in
the auctions hosted by different other peers for bandwidth to
download chunks they want. The bidding price for a chunk
cached at a neighbor is decided by the utility gain the peer
can obtain after acquiring the chunk, minus the network cost
of receiving the chunk from the neighbor. Such an auction-
based algorithm framework encourage peers to download from
neighbors with low network costs in between, in order to
succeed in bandwidth acquisition for chunk downloading.
We also design practical protocols for carrying out the auc-
tions consecutively in a dynamic P2P system, where peers may
come and go, and upload bandwidth can be repeatedly sold
to serve different chunks to different neighbors over time. We
prove that the distributed auctions can collectively maximize
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the social welfare of all peers in the system in Theorem 1.
We implement an emulator of a large-scale, distributed P2P
streaming system where content distribution is carried out
through the auctions. Extensive experiment evaluations verify
the good performance of the system in realistic environments
with real P2P trafﬁc.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. III
presents the P2P content distribution system model and formu-
lates the optimal chunk scheduling problem. Sec. IV presents
a primal-dual auction algorithm to solve the problem and
discusses its practical implementation as a set of distributed
auctions. Sec. V presents our experimental results and Sec. VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Developing ISP-aware P2P protocols has attracted signif-
icant attention from both the content distribution service
providers and the research community. These research work
can be categorized into three camps. The ﬁrst one is to achieve
the network awareness through cooperation between ISPs
and P2P systems. Aggarwal et al. [2] propose a cooperative
mechanism between ISPs and P2P users for a better neighbor
selection process as follows: the ISPs offer an “oracle” to the
P2P users, the peers send their lists of possible neighbors
to the “oracle”, and then the oracle ranks the possible peer
neighbors according to certain criteria, such as their proximity
to the peer or higher bandwidth links in between. Xie et al. [3]
propose P4P, the provider portal for applications. P4P provides
a control plane that can provide network information, such
as network policy, p4p-distance, capabilities, to peer users.
Additional infrastructures are necessary for P4P, which may
not be easy to deploy. These mechanisms require trust between
ISPs and P2P users. The second group of work achieves
network awareness through inferring network information by
peers or based on peers’ self-adaptive protocols. Choffnes et
al. [7] propose to use the information collected from content
distribution networks to guide the biased peer selection. The
rationale is as follows: if two clients are dispatched to a similar
set of replica servers, they are likely to be close to these servers
and more importantly, to each other. This leads to clustered
overlay with a topology following the underlying physical one.
Picconi et al. [4] propose an adaptive protocol for P2P live
streaming with a large number of links between peers located
in different ISPs. It builds a highly clustered primary overlay
with dynamically unchoked secondary inter-cluster links. The
clustered primary overlay can reduce the unnecessary inter-ISP
trafﬁc. The dynamically unchoked secondary inter-cluster links
can ensure that the QoS is not impacted. These mechanisms
use heuristic self-adaptive protocols to reduce the inter-ISP
trafﬁc and keep good performance. Our algorithm explores the
optimality of peers’ utility in an auction based on a primal-
dual optimization framework. The third camp of work exploits
rate control on inter-ISP links. Wang et al. [5] propose and
formulate an optimization problem for rate allocation among
peers in a P2P VoD system. The rate allocation optimization
problem is modeled in the ﬂuid level. It then translates the
ﬂuid-level rate allocation algorithm into an implementable
packet-level scheduling algorithm. Our approach formulates
a packet-level optimization problem for the rate allocation
problem directly and avoids the loss of optimality due to the
ﬂow rate-to-packet scheduling translation.
A sequence of work by Bertsekas et al. [8] [6] theoreti-
cally study the auctions based on a primal-dual optimization
framework for the assignment problems and transportation
problems. Such auction-based optimization has also been ap-
plied in improving the performance of P2P content distribution
[9] [10] [11]. These papers do not take ISP-awareness into
consideration. To the authors’ knowledge, our paper is the
ﬁrst in applying an auction for achieving the social optimality
of ISP-aware P2P content distribution.
III. PROBLEM MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a mesh-based P2P content distribution system,
e.g., a P2P VoD streaming system, deployed over the networks
of M Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Let Pm denote the
set of peers in ISP m ∈ [1,M ]. There exist a number of
tracker servers, from which the peers can obtain a set of
neighbors which may potentially cache the content they want,
upon joining the system. Let Nn(d) denote peer d’s neighbor
set in ISP n. The set of all neighbors of peer d is hence
∪Mn=1Nn(d).
Each content (a ﬁle or a video stream) in the system is
divided into multiple equal-sized chunks and distributed. The
system works in a time slotted fashion over t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T ,
where T is a potentially larger integer. Each peer maintains
a moving window of interest, specifying the chunks it wishes
to download in each time slot (e.g., the chunks to be played
next in a streaming system). A peer exchanges buffer maps
of chunk availability with its neighbors, and requests chunks
of interest from the neighbors which cache the chunks. Let
Rt(d) denote the set of chunks that peer d intends to download
from neighbors at time slot t. A request in the system can be
represented by a three-tuple (Id, Iu, c), where Id is the id of
the downstream peer which issues the request, Iu is the id of
the upstream peer being requested, and c is the identiﬁer of the
requested chunk. We use B(u) to denote the upload bandwidth
of peer u, which represents the number of chunks peer u can
upload in a time slot (suppose one unit of bandwidth is used to
upload one chunk). We assume that peers’ upload bandwidth
renders the bandwidth bottleneck in the system, while the
download bandwidth is much more sufﬁcient comparably.
Let v(c)(d) denote peer d’s valuation for receiving chunk
c, i.e., the value chunk c brings to peer d. Let a(c)u→d be
the indicator of whether request (Id, Iu, c) is served, i.e.,
a
(c)
u→d = 1 if the request is served by the corresponding
upstream peer u, and a(c)u→d = 0 otherwise. The network cost
for peer d to receive a chunk from peer u is wu→d, which
has different values between peers in different pairs of ISPs.
Such a network cost can represent network latency for sending
a chunk between peers, or the possibility that the chunk is
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TABLE I
IMPORTANT NOTATION
M No. of ISPs
Pm Peers in ISP m
Nn(d) Peer d’s total neighbor set in ISP n
B(u) # of chunks peer u can upload in a time slot
Id Id of request source peer
Iu Id of request destination peer
c Index of requested chunk
Rt(d) set of peer d’s interested chunks at time t
N (c)n (d) set of peer d’s neighbors in ISP n with chunk c
a
(c)
u→d indicator of whether request r receives the bandwidth
allocation
v(c)(d) valuation for peer d receiving chunk c
wu→d network cost for transmitting a chunk from u to d
λu dual variables for peer u’s upload bandwidth
η
(c)
d dual variables for request (Id, c)
being blocked due to ﬁltering of egress/ingress P2P trafﬁc at
one ISP. The net utility peer d receives by downloading chunk
c from peer u is v(c)(d)− wu→d.
The important notation in this paper is summarized in table
I for ease of reference.
B. Social Welfare Maximization Problem
In each time slot, we seek to decide the optimal chunk
scheduling strategy, a(c)u→d, for all the chunk requests issued by
all the peers, ∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, c ∈ Rt(d), u ∈ ∪Mn=1N (c)n (d),
to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the total utility of peers
from chunk downloading, as follows:
max
∑
d∈∪Mm=1Pm
∑
c∈Rt(d)
∑
u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
a
(c)
u→d[v
(c)(d)− wu→d]
(1)
s.t.
∑
d,c:u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d),c∈Rt(d)
a
(c)
u→d ≤ B(u),
∀u ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, (2)∑
u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
a
(c)
u→d ≤ 1, ∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, c ∈ Rt(d),
(3)
a
(c)
u→d ∈ {0, 1}, ∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, (4)
c ∈ Rt(d), u ∈ ∪Mn=1N (c)n (d).
Objective function (1) is to maximize the total utility of all
peers. Constraint (2) states that the total number of chunks a
peer uploads to its neighbors should not exceed its upload
bandwidth limit. Constraint (3) speciﬁes that a peer will
download a chunk from no more than one neighbor.
The problem in (1) is an integer linear program. We will
design an efﬁcient primal-dual auction algorithm to solve this
integer linear program. Introducing dual variables λu, η
(c)
d to
constraints (2) and (3) respectively, the dual problem of (1)
can be formulated as follows:
min
∑
u∈∪Mm=1Pm
λuB(u) +
∑
d∈∪Mm=1Pm
∑
c∈Rt(d)
η
(c)
d (5)
s.t.
λu + η
(c)
d ≥ v(c)(d)− wu→d, ∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, (6)
c ∈ Rt(d), u ∈ ∪Mn=1N (c)n (d),
λu ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, (7)
η
(c)
d ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, c ∈ Rt(d). (8)
Note that we omit the integrality constraint (4) in the primal
problem when formulating the dual. Nevertheless, we will
show in the next section that our auction algorithm exactly
solves the primal and dual problems, with optimal binary
solutions to the primal problem.
IV. THE PRIMAL-DUAL AUCTION ALGORITHM
A. Conversion to An Assignment Problem
The social welfare maximization problem in (1) can be
treated as a transportation problem [6]. In a transportation
problem, a set of source nodes are connected to a set of sink
nodes in a bipartite graph. The set of matching edges between
the sources and the sinks are being sought such that each
source is connected to no more than α sinks and each sink is
connected to no more than β sources, and the total weight on
the selected edges is the largest. In our problem, a request for
a speciﬁc chunk c from a peer d, i.e., (Id, c), can be treated
as a source. Each peer u is a sink. An edge connects a source
to a sink if the corresponding sink (peer u) is a neighbor of
the requesting peer d and caches chunk c. The weight on an
edge is v(c)(d)− wu→d. By solving problem (1), we wish to
ﬁnd the subset of edges between the sources and the sinks,
such that each source is connected to no more than one edge
in the set (constraint (3)) and each sink (peer u) is connected
to no more than B(u) edges (constraint (2)).
A transportation problem is an assignment problem in na-
ture. In Bertsekas et al.’s work [6] [8], an auction-like primal-
dual algorithm is designed to solve the classical assignment
problem, where X distinct objects are to be assigned to Y
persons, such that each person receives one object, and the
total weight of the person-object matchings is the largest.
The transportation problem can be converted to an assignment
problem by replacing each source (sink) with α (β) copies of
persons (objects). To convert our problem to an assignment
problem, each sink (peer u) is replaced by B(u) units of
upload bandwidth (treating one unit of upload bandwidth as
one object). Each of the B(u) objects connects to the sources
that sink u connects to in the original problem, and the same
weight as on the original edge is applied on the new edges.
An illustration of our problem in the transportation problem
model, as well as its conversion to the assignment problem,
is given in Fig. 1. Based on this conversion, we are able to
design a primal-dual auction algorithm to solve problem (1),
based on the idea of the auction algorithm in [6].
B. The Primal-Dual Auction Algorithm
The main idea of the primal-dual algorithm is as follows:
Each peer maintains a unit price λu for one unit of its upload
bandwidth, which corresponds to the dual variable in the dual
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Fig. 1. An illustration of our transportation problem (a) and its conversion
to the classical assignment problem (b).
problem (5). Peer u updates the price iteratively, according
to the level of competition for its upload bandwidth, i.e,
the relationship between the number of requests it receives∑
d,c:u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d),c∈Rt(d)
a
(c)
u→d and its overall upload band-
width B(u), and allocates its upload bandwidth for serving
chunks to peers (i.e., computes a(c)u→d) according to the utility
that each chunk can bring to the corresponding requester,
v(c)(d) − wu→d. When the iterative process converges, we
are able to show that the optimal binary solution a(c)∗u→d to the
primal problem and optimal solution λ∗u to the dual problem
are achieved. The optimal values of the other dual variables,
η
(c)
d ’s, are decided by η
(c)∗
d = maxu∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
{v(c)(d) −
wu→d − λ∗u}, which is the minimum value (in order to
minimize the objective function of the dual problem) that
satisﬁes constraint (6).
Based on the above idea, we design a set of distributed,
interleaving auctions to carry out the primal-dual algorithm.
In each time slot, each peer u is an auctioneer, hosting an
auction to sell its B(u) units of upload bandwidth. The peers
who wish to acquire one unit of upload bandwidth at peer u
for retrieving one chunk c that u caches, are the bidders in this
auction. We next describe the bidding strategy of the bidders
and the allocation strategy at the auctioneers, respectively.
Bidding of Peer d: Peer d determines the set of chunks to
download in this time slot, Rt(d), and values each chunk in
Rt(d), i.e., computes v(c)(d), ∀c ∈ Rt(d) (e.g., according to
the playback deadline of a chunk in a P2P streaming system).
Based on exchanged bitmaps with neighbors, peer d can decide
the set of neighbors which cache chunk c, i.e., N (c)n (d), n =
1, . . . ,M . It then decides the following:
(1) From which neighbor to bid for one unit of upload band-
width for retrieving chunk c. The net utility peer d can acquire
by downloading c from peer u ∈ ∪Mn=1N (c)n (d) is decided by
v(c)(d)−wu→d−λu (the bandwidth price λu at peer u is con-
sidered). Let u∗ be the upstream peer that provides the largest
utility, i.e., u∗ = argmax
u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
v(c)(d) − wu→d − λu.
Peer d will send the request for chunk c to peer u∗.
(2) How much peer d should bid for one unit of upload
bandwidth at peer u∗. Let ϕ(d, c, u∗) = v(c)(d)−wu∗→d−λu∗
denote the largest net utility peer d can obtain by downloading
chunk c. Suppose uˆ is the neighbor which can provide the
second largest net utility ϕ(d, c, uˆ) = v(c)(d)− wuˆ→d − λuˆm
if peer d was to download c from uˆ. Peer d bids b(d, c, u∗) =
λu∗ + ϕ(d, c, u
∗) − ϕ(d, c, uˆ) = wuˆ→d − wu∗→d + λuˆ for
one unit of bandwidth to download chunk c from u∗. If bid
b(d, c, u∗) = λu∗ , peer d will not send a bid to auctioneer
u∗, since the bid will nevertheless be unsuccessful, according
to the bandwidth allocation mechanism below. Instead, peer d
waits until the bandwidth prices at the upstream peers change
such that its optimal bid becomes larger than a respective
bandwidth price.
Bandwidth Allocation at Peer u: Peer u maintains an
assignment set containing the requests (Id, c) with the highest
bids, to which it will allocate one unit of its upload bandwidth
(corresponding to a(c)u→d = 1). The maximum size of the
assignment set is B(u). At the beginning of each time slot,
the set is empty and the initial unit bandwidth price is set
to λu = 0. Upon receiving a bid b(d, c, u), if the price
b(d, c, u) ≤ λu, peer u rejects the bid. Otherwise, if its
assignment set is not full, peer u directly adds the request
(Id, c) to the set; if the set is full, the request whose bidding
price is the lowest among all the requests in the assignment
set (which equals λu), is removed from the set (i.e., set the
respective a(c)u→d = 0), and request (Id, c) is added. If the
size of the assignment set is B(u) (i.e., all B(u) units of
its upload bandwidth are allocated), Peer u updates λu to
the smallest bidding price among all accepted requests in the
current assignment set, and informs its neighbors this updated
bandwidth price.
A bid at an upstream peer u can be unsuccessful due to
concurrent bids from other peers which push the price λu up,
or can be accepted ﬁrst but removed from the assignment set
later on, due to the arrival of higher bids. In these cases, the
bidder can compute its new bid according to the updated prices
from the upstream peers, and bid again either to the same
upstream peer u (if v(c)(d)−wu→d−λu is still the largest), or
to another upstream peer u′ (if v(c)(d)−wu′→d−λ′u becomes
the largest).
The auction in each time slot repeats iteratively, until the
bidding process converges, i.e., no auctioneer u wishes to
change its bandwidth allocation a(c)u→d’s and price λu, and no
bidder wishes to bid again. Then the chunks corresponding
to the winning bids are transmitted to the respective bidders,
using the acquired bandwidth. The auction algorithm for one
time slot is summarized in Alg. 1. The fully distributed auction
algorithm achieves maximized social welfare, as given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the assumption that the upload band-
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width and the distribution of peers’ cached chunks in the
system can satisfy peers’ downloading requirements in each
time slot, Alg. 1 terminates and gives the optimal solution
a
(c)∗
u→d to the primal problem (1) and λ
∗
u to the dual problem
(5) upon termination.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 The Auction Algorithm in Time Slot t
***At Bidder Peer d:***
1: exchange buffer maps with neighbors and decide Rt(d)
2: for each chunk c in Rt(d) do
3: calculate net utility v(c)(d)−wu→d − λu for all neigh-
bors which cache c, and select neighbor u∗ providing
the largest net utility
4: send bid b(d, c, u∗) = wuˆ→d−wu∗→d+λuˆ to neighbor
u∗, where uˆ is the neighbor providing the second largest
net utility
5: end for
6: upon failure to acquire a unit of bandwidth for a chunk c
at a neighbor u and price updates from neighbors
7: repeat Lines 3 and 4 with updated prices
***At Auctioneer Peer u: ***
1: Initialization: λu = 0, assignment set A = ∅
2: while a bid b(d, c, u) is received do
3: if b(d, c, u) ≤ λu then
4: reject the bid
5: else
6: if size of A equals B(u) then
7: ﬁnd a request (Id′ , c′) inA whose bid is the lowest,
A ← A− {(Id′ , c′)}
8: end if
9: A ← A+ {(Id, c)}
10: if size of A equals B(u) then
11: update λu to the smallest bid among all requests
in A, and inform neighbors the new price
12: end if
13: end if
14: end while
C. Implementation Issues in a Dynamic P2P System
Over time, the auctions according to Alg. 1 repeat in each
time slot, and upload bandwidth at each peer is repeatedly sold
to serve different chunks to different neighbors. The time slot
in our model can be treated as the bidding cycle, according to
which peers decide the next batch of chunks to download and
seek the upstream peers which can serve the chunks through
the auctions. The actual chunk transfers happen as soon as the
auction algorithm converges in each time slot (i.e., when the
optimal chunk scheduling is decided), and can be ﬁnished into
the next time slot (i.e., bidding for bandwidth for retrieving
the next batch of chunks can happen concurrently with the
transfer of the previous batch of chunks).
Peers may come and go in a dynamic P2P system. When an
auctioneer peer u receives new bids from newly joined peers
in the middle of a time slot, it delays handling of these bids
until the start of the next time slot, such that the convergence
of the auction process in this time slot is not disturbed. Upon
departure of a peer when the auction algorithm is still running
in a time slot, the algorithm can handle it smoothly and
converge to the maximum social welfare where the departed
peer is excluded. If an auctioneer peer departs when chunk
transfers have started in a time slot, the unaffected chunk
transfer schedules remain and the impact of the peer departure
will be taken into consideration in the next time slot.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate our auction based content distribution algorithm,
we emulate an efﬁcient multi-threaded P2P VoD system in
Java and deploy it on a cluster of 6 high-performance blade
servers with a 16-core Intel Xeon E5-2600 processor and 80G-
B RAM. Each peer in the system is emulated by one process.
Real network trafﬁc is sent between peers in the system. The
program at each peer includes the following components: a
neighbor manager for updating the peer’s neighbors; a buffer
manager for retaining chunks and exchanging bitmaps with the
neighbors; a bidding module for calculating bids and sending
them to auctioneers; an allocator module for determining the
allocation of upload bandwidth; a transmission manager for
transmitting chunks to the winning bidders. We emulate 5
ISPs. Peers of the same ISP are deployed in the same server.
There is a track server which keeps track of online peers and
bootstraps new joining peers with a list of neighbors with close
playback positions.
We set up the experiments to emulate a realistic P2P video
streaming system, such as YouTube [12], YouKu [13]. We use
short video ﬁles just like most videos on YouTube, and the
size of a video ﬁle is around 20 MB. The playback bitrate
of a video is 640 Kbps, which is similar to the bitrate of a
YouTube 360p video. We choose the chunk size of 8 KB just
as the size of a sub-piece in PPStream [14]. There are 100
videos in the system.
Our emulator supports dynamic peer joins and departures.
Peers join the system as a poison process with rate 1 peer
per second, and are distributed in the 5 ISPs evenly. When a
peer joins the system, it will select video i (1 ≤ i ≤ 100)
to watch according to the Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution p(i) =
1
(i+q)α∑100
i=1
1
(i+q)α
, α = 0.78, q = 4 [15]. The default number of
neighbors for each peer is 30. A peer tries to pre-fetch 10
seconds of the video, i.e., it tries to download the next 100
chunks in advance of the playback position. In each ISP, for
each video, there are 2 seed peers with a upload bandwidth
that is 8 times of the streaming rate, which cache the complete
video. We know that there are different types of Internet
connection services with different levels of upload bandwidth
[16]. As the technology develops, both the streaming rates of
Internet videos and the upload bandwidths of peers are moving
to higher levels. Hence, we set the upload capacity of peers
following the uniform distribution within the range of [1, 4]
times of the streaming bitrate in our system.
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We use a deadline-based valuation function, αdlog(βd+d) , for
chunk evaluation at the peers [9], emphasizing how urgent a
chunk is for playback. Here d is the time to the playback
deadline of the chunk, αd and βd are constants with default
values αd = 2 and βd = 1.2. Hence, the deadline-based
valuation is within the range of [0.8, 8].
We use network latency as the network cost in our ex-
periments. The inter-ISP link delay costs and intra-ISP link
delay costs follow truncated normal distributions [17]. The
distribution of inter-ISP link costs has a mean 5 and a standard
variance 1, truncated within range [1, 10]. The distribution of
intra-ISP link cost has a mean 1 and a standard variance 1,
truncated within range [0, 2] .
A. Convergence of the Bandwidth Price
We ﬁrst study the evolution of the price for one unit of
upload bandwidth, λu, with our auction algorithm, in a static
network with 500 peers. Each time slot lasts 10 seconds.
During one time slot, a peer keeps bidding in order to acquire
the bandwidth to receive the 100 chunks it wants next. Fig. 2
plots the evolution of the price λu at a representative peer. For
better illustration, we only show the evolution of the price in
the time slots between 150 seconds and 250 seconds, and the
evolution of the price is similar in other time slots. We can
see that the price converges after around 5 seconds in each
time slot. This veriﬁes the convergence of our auction-like
primal-dual algorithm.
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Fig. 2. The evolution of a peer’s price λu.
In the following subsections, we compare the social wel-
fare, inter-ISP trafﬁc and chunk miss rate under our auction
algorithm with a simple locality-aware chunk scheduling algo-
rithm, as follows: each downstream peer requests chunks from
upstream neighbors with the lowest network costs in between
as much as possible; for bandwidth allocation at an upstream
peer, it always prioritizes to transmit chunks with more urgent
deadlines.
B. Social Welfare
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the system’s social welfare in
each time slot in a dynamic P2P network, where peers arrive
following the dynamic model described at the beginning of
this section, and stay until they ﬁnish watching the respective
video. We can see that as more peers join the system over
time, larger social welfare per time slot can be achieved with
our auction algorithm. However, the social welfare achieved
by the simple locality-aware algorithm drops due to more
inter-ISP trafﬁc incurred with more peers in the system. The
negative values of the social welfare with this algorithm are
because it does not consider peers’ chunk valuation when
scheduling chunk transmissions (such that v(c)(d)−wu→d can
be negative).
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Fig. 3. Comparison of social welfare.
C. Inter-ISP Trafﬁc
Fig. 4 shows the percentage of inter-ISP trafﬁc incurred
in all the trafﬁc in the system in each time slot in a static
network of 500 peers. We can see that the percentage of inter-
ISP trafﬁc is smaller with our auction algorithm, since with our
algorithm, a peer only downloads a chunk from an ISP with
a large network cost in between when its valuation for the
chunk is large enough, reducing unnecessary inter-ISP trafﬁc
as much as possible.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of inter-ISP trafﬁc.
D. Chunk Download Performance
Fig. 5 plots the averaged chunk miss rate of all peers in a
static network of 500 peers, which is the percentage of chunks
which fail to be downloaded before the respective playback
deadlines. With our auction algorithm, the averaged chunk
miss rate is smaller. This veriﬁes the efﬁciency of upload
bandwidth allocation in our auction algorithm, which takes
downstream peers’ valuation of the chunks into consideration.
E. Comparison under Peer Dynamics
Fig. 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c) show the social welfare, inter-ISP
trafﬁc and chunk miss rate with our algorithm and the simple
locality protocol, in a dynamic P2P network where peers arrive
following the dynamic model described at the beginning of this
section, and depart at any time with probability 0.6. We can
see that our algorithm still performs better in general than the
simple locality-aware algorithm in case of peer dynamics.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the chunk miss rate.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of social welfare, inter-ISP trafﬁc and chunk miss rate
under peer dynamics.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the optimal chunk dissemination topol-
ogy construction problem in a P2P content distribution system,
with the objective of social welfare maximization with min-
imal inter-ISP trafﬁc. We utilize a primal-dual optimization
framework and design an efﬁcient auction algorithm to achieve
the optimal dissemination topology in a fully distributed
manner. Our experiments under realistic settings based on
emulator implementation of a P2P streaming system verify
the algorithm’s efﬁcacy in reducing ISP-unfriendly trafﬁc and
maintaining good chunk download performance. This work
represents our initial attempt to design an auction-like mecha-
nism to encourage peers’ voluntary download from neighbors
with low network costs in between. We are improving the
auction mechanism design to enforce truthfulness of the bids
in cases of selﬁsh peers that may manipulate the mechanism,
in our ongoing work.
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APPENDIX
Proof: The proof consists of two parts: (i) The auction
algorithm terminates in a ﬁnite number of iterations, and (ii)
upon termination, the complementary slackness of the primal
and dual optimization problems in (1) and (5) is satisﬁed.
(i) The termination of the auction algorithm can be proved
by way of contradiction. Suppose it never terminates. Then the
number of units of allocated bandwidth is non-decreasing, be-
cause one unit of bandwidth, once allocated, remains allocated
throughout the auction. The total number of units of allocated
bandwidth is upper-bounded by the overall bandwidth demand
from downloading peers in the system. Under the assumption
that the overall upload bandwidth is sufﬁcient to serve each
chunk, there exist units of upload bandwidth that are never
allocated. Therefore, since the algorithm does not terminate,
we can infer that there exists a peer wanting to download a
chunk, which bids for one unit of bandwidth at an upstream
peer u1 whose bandwidth has all been allocated and whose
price is growing unboundedly, rather than bids at another peer
u2 with a unit of unallocated bandwidth and bandwidth price
0. This implies that the valuation of downloading the chunk
from peer u2 with bandwidth price 0 is negative inﬁnity (this
is the only possibility when u1 is always selected rather than
u2), contradicting the fact that the valuation should be ﬁnite.
(ii) We ﬁrst list the complementary slackness conditions of
the primal and dual problems:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λu > 0 →
∑
d,c:u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d),c∈Rt(d)
a
(c)
u→d = B(u),
∀u ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm,
a
(c)
u→d > 0 → λu + η(c)d = v(c)d − wu→d,
d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, c ∈ Rt(d), u ∈ ∪Mn=1N (c)n (d).
η
(c)
d > 0 →
∑
u∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
a
(c)
u→d = 1,
∀d ∈ ∪Mm=1Pm, c ∈ Rt(d).
The ﬁrst condition means that the upload bandwidth at a
peer u with a non-zero bandwidth price must have all been
allocated. This is obviously true with our algorithm, since if
there is one unit of unallocated bandwidth, the bandwidth price
at peer u should be λu = 0.
The second condition states that when a request (Id, c)
obtains a unit of bandwidth from peer u, the optimal so-
lution η(c)d should be equal to v
(c)
d − wu→d − λu. Recal-
l that the optimal value of η(c)d is computed as η
(c)
d =
max
u′∈∪Mn=1N (c)n (d)
{v(c)(d) − wu′→d − λu′}. Since the net
utility v(c)d −wu→d−λu for peer d to download chunk c from
peer u is the largest among the net utilities from all neighbors
that can provide chunk c to peer d, the second condition is
satisﬁed.
The third condition states that when a request (Id, c)’s
achieved maximum utility is larger than 0, it deﬁnitely has
acquired a unit of upload bandwidth. This is obviously true
with the algorithm, since if a request does not receive a unit
of upload bandwidth, its achieved maximum utility η(c)d will
be 0.
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